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INFORMATION REPORT

PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COUNTRY
Hungary

25X1

SUBJECT
Hungarian Air Defense System

DATE DISTRIBUTED
28 February 1957

NO. OF PAGES 13 | NO. OF ENCLS. 9

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT #

25X1

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

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This report is the result of a joint interrogation by the Air Force, the Army and CIA and is disseminated in accordance with the provisions of NSCID #7.

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1. Eastern Air Defense Command Post, Hq at Kecskemet Airfield (4655N/1945E). (This was called "Radar filter center" on Encl #1).

2. Western Air Defense Command Post, Hq at Taszar (4622N/1754E). (Called, "Radar filter center" on Encl #1.).

C. Two Ground Observer Corps (GOC) filter centers, subordinate to the Western Air Defense Command Post (Taszar), were located at Veszprem (4705N/1754E) and Kaposvar (4624N/1743E).

D. A GOC training center was located at Kiskunfelegyhaza (4643N/1951E). This was formerly a GOC filter center also, however, it was transformed into a training center when it was determined that there was no need for a filter center at that location.

E. 53 GOC posts were subordinate to the Veszprem and Kaposvar filter centers, and were located along the Hungarian-Austrian and Yugoslavian border, 8-16km apart. GOC observers were effective up to 8kms outside the Hungarian border. Reference, Encl #1 for location of the first of these GOC posts.

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[redacted] 25X1

F. 19 Hungarian radar posts were subordinate to the Kecskemet and Taszar Air Defense Command posts. Two Soviet radar posts were directly subordinate to the Soviet liaison officer at OLP in Budapest, but could be incorporated into the Hungarian radar net upon requesting the Soviet liaison officer to do so. See, par 4 below for locations, numbering system, and subordination of each radar post.

2. Hungarian Air Defense Command Hq (OLP)

A. Reference, Encl #3, overlay on street map of Budapest, "Budapest Delsiterilete" Kartografiai Vallalat, 1956 [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

1. Villanyi Ut.
2. Gellert Hill (Kis Gellert-H.)
3. Schweidel Ut.
4. Air Defense Command Hq (OLP), six story. dimensions: 60x30x50m. Curve-shaped to follow contours of the street; [redacted] the building was made of brick, flat roof. It contained numerous air defense offices and maintenance shops. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

[redacted] 25X1

B. Reference, Encl #4, [redacted] the cross-section of the underground portion of Air Defense Command Hq (OLP). 25X1

C. Reference, Encl #5, [redacted] the partial layout of the under HQ of the OLP on which he identified the following points: 25X1

1. Main tunnel entrance, from bldg, Pt #4, Encl #3.
2. Side tunnel entrance, for heating plant personnel and delivery of coal.
3. Telephone frame room.
4. Intelligence officers' room.
5. Library
6. Female officers' quarters.
7. Teletype room.
8. Hungarian Flight control room.
9. Senior flight control director.
10. Air Defense plotting room.
11. Tunnel, destination unk.
12. Soviet liaison officer.
13. Papa Airfield air intelligence (Soviet).
14. Officers' bedroom.
15. EM bedroom.
16. Wire maintenance and wire control.
17. Heating and air-conditioning plant.
18. Telephone switchboard.
19. Political adjutant's conference room.
20. Communications offices.
21. 9236th AA Reg Adjutant (Non-political).
22. Office, for use by OLP officers; seldom used.
23. Office, for use by OLP officers; seldom used.
24. Office, for use by OLP officers; seldom used.
25. Electric parts supply.
26. Training offices.
27. Political adjutant's office.
28. Commanding officer's office.
29. Storage room.
30. Topography drafting room.
31. Classified control office.
32. Office supply room.
33. Kitchen
34. Enlisted men mess.
35. Officers' mess.

25X1

D. [redacted] the underground HQ of the OLP was a regular labyrinth which stretched out for many miles under all of greater Budapest. [redacted] it was possible to go under the Danube river thru these tunnels and arrive almost any place in greater Budapest. It was impossible, therefore, to draw the entire network of tunnels; probably no one man knows it. [redacted] information about the underground network:

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1. Tunnel corridors were 1-2m wide, 2 ½m high; inverted "U" shaped; whitewashed walls; probably brick.
2. Electric bulbs lighted corridors. There was flourescent lighting in rooms.
3. All rooms had vaulted ceilings.
4. There was no drainage or leakage problem. Tunnels and rooms were very dry inside.
5. [redacted] a total of three underground levels, however, there may have been more. Several rooms and tunnels were either sealed off or locked

25X1

6. [redacted]

25X1

7. Ventilation and air-conditioning system consisted of a large heating and air-conditioning plant (underground), from which two pipes, one for inlet and one for outlet, led to each room. This system did not always work well, resulting in foul air. All newly assigned personnel to the OLP were first taken down to determine whether or not they could [redacted]

25X1

E. [redacted] See, Enclosure #6, for layout of the air defense Aircraft plotting room at OLP. This section worked in three shifts: 24 hrs work-24 hrs off. Personnel could leave the underground installation only on Wednesdays and Saturdays, even though they may have other days off. There were 18 personnel working on each shift, as follows:

1. 18 enlisted men (Hungarian)
2. 10 Officers (Hungarian), of whom five spoke other Satellite or Russian languages.
3. 2 Soviet enlisted men.
4. 1 Soviet Officer
5. 3 Teletype Operators (Enlisted Men)

The above breakdown was similar for each shift. There was a total of three Soviet Officers and six Soviet enlisted men assigned to this section of OLP.

F. Reference, Encl #7, Grid System for Tracking Aircraft. [redacted]

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[redacted] the same grid system was utilized in all of the Soviet and Satellite countries. The main code number, composed of four digits, was the key to all other grid blocks of nine smaller squares. This main code number was changed every 10-30 days. [redacted] the Aircraft plotting room utilized a 1:500,000 map with 12mm grids. As an example, utilizing "1526" as the main code, based on the location of Budapest within the grid block, one could pinpoint all locations in Hungary. The USSR and other Satellite countries, by six or seven digits. Thus, the exact location of Budapest would be 152648. "1526" being the large grid block number, "4"-the smaller square within the grid block, and "8"-the smallest square within the #4 square. Reference, Encl #7 for reproduction of this grid system. Based on the Budapest code number (152648). [redacted]

25X1

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1. Zalaegerszeg ------ 164314
2. Szombathely ------ 152371
3. Papa ---------- 152495
4. Debrecen ------- 153098

25X1

5. Kecskemet ---------- 164754
6. Taszar ---------- 177445
7. Tokol ---------- 152663
8. Hajduszoboszlo ---------- 153084

Thus, even if the main code is changed every 10-30 days, unless the scale of the entire grid system is changed, it would be possible to reconstruct the grid system, knowing the above locations. Taking "1526" as the main grid block code number, the numbering system for other grid blocks was as follows:

1. Right adjacent grid block would be "1527" the next one "1528", then, "1529", and so on, in consecutive sequence.

2. Left adjacent grid block would be "1525", then "1524", and so on, to the left.

3. Above adjacent grid block would be 1406, i.e. 1526 minus 120. The numbering system to the right and left would follow consecutively, i.e. to the right, it would be; 1407, 1408, 1409, etc.; to the left, it would be 1405, 1404, 1403, etc.

4. The grid block directly under "1526" and adjacent to it, would be "1646", i.e. 1526 plus 120. The numbering to the right and left would then follow the same consecutive pattern as explained above Reference, Enclosure #7, for reproduction of the grid, utilizing the above examples.

3. AIR DEFENSE COMMAND POST HQ

All of Hungary was divided into two Air Defense Areas of responsibilities. The area east of the Danube river was the Eastern Air Defense Command Post with HQ at Kecskemet Airfield (4655N/1945E). The area west of the Danube was the Western Air Defense Command Post with Hq at Taszar (4622N/1754E).

A. Eastern Air Defense Command Post Hq. (Kecskemet Airfield). Reference, Encl #8 for a pinpoint location of the Eastern Air Defense Command Post Hq on Kecskemet Airfield. See Encl #9, layout sketch of the air defense Aircraft plotting room at Kecskemet,

25X1

1. Liaison booth

2. Booth for Soviet liaison officer

3. Booths for AAA unit personnel

4. Liaison booth

5. Radio console for fighter control

6. Commanding Officer

7. Horizontal plotting table for fighter aircraft control

8. Horizontal plotting table for fighter aircraft control

9. Horizontal plotting table for fighter aircraft control

10. PPI Commander for Kecskemet radars

11. Teletype transmitter; one communications officer and one teletype operator

[redacted] 25X1

12. NCO-in-charge of coding

13. Local flight-control officer

14. Senior director

15. Director of Radars

16. Two radio operators

17. Horizontal plotting board, around which were:

a. Officer-in-charge

b. Target Officer

c. Plotter

d. Information-relay enlisted men

(18-26. vertical boards for plotting individual radar station data, which was received in circular grid (i.e. radar scope grid).

18. Radar station #516 (Mezocsat) plotting board

19. Radar station #508 (Kecskemet), P-8 radar, plotting brd

20. Radar station #511 (Debrecen) plotting board.

21. Radar station #508 (Kecskemet), P-20 radar, plotting brd.

22. Radar station #505 (Szeged), plotting board.

23. Radar station #514 (Janoshalma) plotting board.

24. Radar station #517 (Bekescaba) plotting board.

25. Radar station #509 (Kalocsa) plotting board.

26. Radar station #512 (Kiskunlachaza) plotting board.

27. Vertical plotting board for all of Hungary.

See Incl #10. The floor plan layout of the 2nd story of the Eastern Air Defense Command post Hq Building.

[redacted] 25X1

B. Western Air Defense Command Post Hq (Taszar).

[redacted]

5. Radar Net in Hungary:
See, Incl #1, Hungarian Air Defense Net*. for graphic representation of the locations of the radar stations. [redacted] 25X1

Station # (Classified)	Nearest Town & Coordinates	Type of Radar(s)	Reliability
* 501	Egerag (4755 9N/1818E)	P-8 & P-20	Reliable
* 502	Marcalto (4[illegible]6N/1722E)	P-8 & P-20	Reliable
* 503	Nagykanizsa (4627N/1722E)	P-8 & P-20	Reliable

* 504	Szekesfehervar (4712N/1825E)	P-20	Unreliable
** 505	Szeged (5615N/2009E)	P-8 & P-20	Very Reliable
** 506	Hatvan (4740N/1941E)	P-8	Station not in use
*507	Taszar (4622N/1754E)	P-8 & P-20	Reliable
**508	Kecskemet (4654N/1941E)	P-8 & P-20	Reliable
**509	Kalocsa (4632N/1859E)	P-8 & P-20	Fairly Reliable
* 510	Sarmellek (4643N/1710E)	P-8 & P-20	Reliable
**511	Debrecen (4731N/2139E)	P-8 & P-20	Fairly Reliable
**512	Kiskunlachaza (4711N/1900$)	P-8 & P-20	Fairly Reliable
*513	Homoksentgyorgy (4806N/1734E)	P-8 & P-20	Reliable
**514	Janoshalma (4618N/1919E)	P-8 & P-20	Reliable
515	Harmashatarhegy--This station was phased out completely		
**516	Mezocsat (4749N/2054E)	P-8 & P-20	Reliable
**517	Bekescsaba (4639N/2105E)	P-8 & P-20	Unreliable
*518	Fertoszentmiklos (4735N/1653E)	P-8 & P-20	Fairly Reliable
*519	Fertorakos (4744N/1640E)	P-8 & P-20	Fairly Reliable
*SOVIET	Papa Airfield (4720N/1728E)	P-8 & P-20	Unknown
*SOVIET	Debrecen Airfield (4731N/2139E)	P-8 & P-20	Unknwon

NOTE: *-----Radar station was subordinated to the Western Air Defense command post Hq at Taszar Airfield.

**____Radar station subordinated to the Eastern Air Defense command post at Kecskemet Airfield.

5. Ground Observer Corps (GOC) Organization.

See, Incl #1 for locations of the GOC filter centers and observer posts; and, para Ic, Id, Ie, above, for the general organization of the Hungarian GOC.

A. See Incl #11 for a typical layout of a GOC post. Each post had 5-6 personnel. They utilized R-20 radios. GOC posts had to report all aircraft sighted to either the Veszprem or Kaposvar GOC filter centers, depending in which area of responsibility they were.

B. Procedure for reporting aircraft was in the following sequence:

1. Filter center call sign, composed of three letters (given - twice).

2. "VZD", abbreviation of Russian word, "Vozdukh." (Air), which signified an unknown aircraft.

3. Direction of aircraft from GOC post.

4. Distance from post in kms.

5. Direction of departure from GOC post.

6. Altitude in hectometers.

7. Number of aircraft.

8. Type of aircraft (in code numbers).

9. Time aircraft was closest to GOC post.

10. GOC post number (two digits).

All of the above was given in the clear, in Morse code.

6. Flight Regulations for Friendly Aircraft
All aircraft civilian and military landing or taking-off in Hungary had to obtain a flight permit the day prior to the proposed flight, from the ministry of military affairs, giving them the: Time of departure, aircraft speed, altitude and destination. They would, then, receive an authorization immediately after taking-off on the flight, the pilot had to call the nearest Air Defense Command post Hq (Kecskemet or Taszar), giving them the authorization number. The command post filter center would then pre-plot the flight for the pilot.

B. The procedure for Soviet Aircraft flying into Hungary was to have the OLP at Lvov (Lembert) (4950N/2400E) report all Soviet Aircraft flights into Hungary to OLP in Budapest one day in advance of the proposed flight. OLP in Budapest then notified the areas over which the aircraft would fly. If the aircraft was late, it identified itself by NRZ (IFF). [redacted] the Air Defense Hq)OLP) in Lvov (Lemberg) was similar to the one in Budapest. (See attachment). 25X1

7. Reporting Unidentified Aircraft and Scrambling Procedures.
The sequence of reporting unidentified aircraft and subsequent scrambling procedures [redacted] was as follows (in order): 25X1

A. Aircraft sighted.
B. When an aircraft was spotted by a radar station, it assigned the aircraft a radar track number and transmitted the following information t the operations center of the signal Regiment at either the Eastern- or Western Air Defense Command Post Hq by both radio and telephone (both were transmitted in the clear):

1. Aircraft track number.

2. Number of degrees from the station.

3. Distance from the station.

4. Time of plotting (ie. sighting).

5. Altitude (if measureable).

C. The operations center at the Air Defense signal Regiment, then, plotted the aircraft on the side plotting board and attempted to identify the aircraft.

D. If the aircraft could not be identified, the operations center requested the aircraft filter center at the Air Defense Command post to assign a target track and number the unidentified aircraft and plot the aircraft flight on the main plotting board.

1. When an aircraft was assigned a target track and number and was plotted on the main board it was considred either enemy or one that was not complying with flight regulations.

2. All unidentified aircraft were plotted on the main board at one minute intervals. Normal plotting for friendly aircraft was at two minute intervals.

3. All unidentified aircraft reported from the Western Air Defense Command post Hq at Taszar were numbered from 1401-1450, consecutivel All unidentified aircraft reported from the Eastern Air Defense Command post Hq at Kecskemet were numbered from 1451-1499, consecutively.

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E. Simultaneously, as the unidentified aircraft was being plotted on the main plotting board at Air Defense Command Headquarters, the filter center plotter there would call the plotting room at OLP, Budapest by telephone. This call would also be heard in the local Air Intelligence Situation Briefing and Coordination Center (See Incl #10 for example). Format of the TP message was as follows:

1. Target track number for unidentified aircraft

2. Position of aircraft (in grid).

3. Altitude in hectometers.

4. Time (Moscow time).

Example: *1451 3202534 40 1650*.

F. To insure that OLP, Budapest, received the above message, the air intelligence situation briefing and coordinatinn center (see Incl #10 for example) followed up the telephone message with a radio transmittal, giving the following information:

1. Target track number for unidentified aircraft.

2. Number of aircraft

3. Type of aircraft (in code).

4. Altitude in hectometers

5. Time (Moscow time)

6. Activity of aircraft bombing, recon, etc. if applicable.

Example: "1451 2 396 40 1650 (547)"

G. Upon receiving the above information, the filter center at OLP transferred the aircraft plotting from the "H-I-T-O-T-E" (Board showing height, identification, time, etc.) to the main aircraft plotting board. The "HITOTE" board at OLP filter center had all of the above information, plus the number of the radar station reporting the unidentified aircraft. The code words utilized by the Air Defense Command Post HQ and OLP for friendly and unfriendly aircraft were:

1. "REPULO"-----friendly aircraft

2. "LEVEGO"_____unknown or enemy aircraft. All messages beginning with this word had the highest priority.

H. OLP transmitted this information to BOTH Air Defense Command Post Hq by radio. Simultaneously, the same information was transmitted within OLP itself by radio and telephone, going to the OLP Fighter Control Center and the OLP Air Intelligence Situation Briefing and Coordinating Center.

I. If the unidentified aircraft was still far from the Hungarian border, the Air Defense Command Post Hq (KECSKEMET or Taszar) obtained permission from OLP to "Scramble" their interceptor aircraft. If the unidentified aircraft was already near the border, the Air Defense Command Post Hq would notify the airfield which was on scramble status and give the order to intercept the unidentified aircraft, and then notify OLP of the action taken. In the event that either Kecskemet or Taszar airfields were on scramble status, a red rocket would be fired from the fighter control center at Air Defense Command Post Hq, which would be the order to scramble one or two fighter intercepter aircraft. Radio contact was maintained with the interceptors before and after they had scrambled.

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1. Each fighter airfield had its own Fighter Control Center and each airfield within an Air Defense Command Post Hq was periodically assigned scramble duty. This duty was rotated among all the fighter bases within that Air Defense Command Post Headquarters. Radio contact was maintained between the airfield on scramble status and its repective Air Defense Command Post Headquarters.

2. The airfield on scramble status would be required to scramble its interceptors fiest, even if another airfield in the same Air Defense Command Post Headquarters area of responsibility was located closet to the position of the unidentified aircraft. This fact accounted for sev several instances of an inability to successfully intercept the unidentified aircraft.

3. Thus, at any given time, in all of Hungary, there were only two fighter airbases on scramble status, one in each Air Defense Command Post Headquarters area of responsibility. The rest of the Fighter bases had their aircraft on alert status, but would not scramble until the airfield on scramble status had done so.

4. The two priorities were as follows:

a. Number 1---"Scramble status", which meant that two interceptor aircraft were ready for take-off, with the pilots already in the aircraft and maintaining radio contact with the local Fighter Control Center.

b. Number 2---"Alert Status", which meant that the remaining air bases had their aircraft ready, however, the pilots were not in the aircraft.

J. When an unidentified aircraft approached the Hungarian border, all airfields would be put on scramble status, however, the two airfields which were on scramble duty would be the first to send up their interceptor aircraft.

K. The time lapse between sighting of an aircraft by a radar station and scrambling the interceptors was usually between 3-4 minutes. The maximum time lapse was six minutes.

L. Taking a hypothetical case wherein an airfield scrambles its fighters to intercept an unidentified aircraft, and a second unidentified aircraft appears in the same Air Defense Command Post area of responsibility, instead of giving scramble orders to a second airfield in that area, fighters were scrambled from the other Air Defense Command Post area of responsibility and directed to the nearest unidentified aircraft, while the first interceptors were diverted to the second unidentified aircraft. This action also accounted for cases where the interceptors were unable to catch up with the unidentified aircraft.

M. Interceptors usually scrambled from airfields so distant from the unidentified aircraft that they had to fly at maximum speeds in order to catch up with the unidentified aircraft. This often resulted in over-shooting the target. A "Tail-Chase" tactic, then, had to be employed. This was not too successful. The interceptors, upon approaching the unidentified aircraft could not reduce their speed without losing altitude, therefore, a repeated "Tail-Chasing" tactic was their only solution.

N. The radar station operator was partially responsibile for successfully intercepting unidentified aircraft for this reason. If the radar operator thought that interceptors could not catch up with the unidentified aircraft, he gave a "Fade" on the unidentified aircraft to make it appear that the radar had lost the aircraft. Source added that a radar operator could be imprisoned for five years for such false reporting. There were two radar scopes in operation at each radar station at any given time. One was for the operator and one for the radar station duty officer. However, duty

25X1

officers usually did not object to such false reporting, since they were also partly responsible for successfully intercepting the unidentified aircraft. radar stations # 508, 509, and 514, frequently gave false reports (see Incl #1, and par. IV, above, for locations of the stations). 25X1

O. Soviets utilized the same scramble net. In the event that an unidentified aircraft was near a Soviet airfield, the Soviet liaison officer at OLP could order Soviet aircraft to scramble. This was usually done upon request of the Hungarian Fighter Control Center at OLP. The Soviet liaison officers at the Western and Eastern Aid Defense Command Post Headquarters at Taszar and Kecskemet, respectively, did not have this authority.

8. Soviet and Hungarian Airfields.
The airfields listed below and the types of aircraft thereon is hearsay information:

AIRFIELD & COORDINATES	SUBORDINATION	TYPE OF A/C
*1. PAPA (47722N/1730E)	Soviet	MIG-15; MIG-17; IL-28
*2. TASZAR (4623N/1755E)	Hungarian	MIG-15; MIG-17
*3. Samellek (4641N/1710E)	Hungarian	MIG-15; MIG-17
*4. Kalocsa (4633N/1857E)	Hungarian	MIG-15; MIG-17
*5. Kiskunlachaza (4711N/1904E)	Hungarian	MIG-15; MIG-17
*6. Kecskemet (4655N/1945E)	Hungarian	MIG-15; MIG-17
*7. Debrecen (4730N/2137E)	Soviet	MIG-15; MIG-17; IL-28
8. Kunmadaras (4724N/2047E)	Hungarian	IL-10; 2-IL-28S; MIG-15; MIG-17
9. Tokol (4721N/1859E)	Soviet	LI-2; IL-28
10. Szekesfehervar (4709N/1825E)	Soviet	IL-28; possibly other types A/C.
11. Szentkiralyszabadja (4705N/1758E)	Soviet	IL-28; possibly other types A/C.

*-Indicates airfields that scrambled fighter-interceptor aircraft. 25X1

9. Aid Corridors for Flights Over Hungary
Reference, Incl #1, there were eight points of entry, i.e, air corridors, into Hungary, numbered fron 1-8, in Roman numerals on Incl #1. Fragmentary information of each of these corridors is as follows: 25X1

CORRIDOR #	INFORMATION
1.	No information
2.	Most of the A/C traffic to and from Rumania utilized this corridor.
3.	Traffic consisted of 2-3 A/C daily.
4.	Corridor very seldom used.
5.	Traffic consisted of 2-3 A/C daily.
6.	No info. 25X1
7.	
8.	Heaviest air traffic thru this corridor.

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10. Joint Air Defense Training Exercises

[redacted] every spring and summer joint Air Defense exercises were held by the Soviet and Satellite forces. Units were notified only one day prior to beginning of the exercise. Exercises were planned jointly, in Moscow. Air Defense Headquarters for these exercises, as well as for actual attack were located in the following cities:

A. USSR-Lemberg (Lvov) (495 0N/2400E).
Munkacs (coordinates unknown)

B. Czechoslovakia-Prague (5006N/1427E)
Zvolen (4834N/1915E)
Bratislava (4810N/1706E)
Kassa (coordinates unknown)

C. Rumania-Bucharest (4434N/2605E)
Temesvar (coordinates unknown)

During these exercises, and in actual practice, Rumanian radar was considered completely unreliable by the Hungarian Air Force standards. IL-28's were utilized as the target (unfriendly) aircraft. MIG-15's were utilized as the interceptor aircraft (friendly). [redacted] a large air-ground exercise was held in September 1956 for all members of the Warsaw pact. This exercise lasted one week. Every airfield and aircraft was on number 1 scramble status (see par. VII, 1, 4, above.) for the duration of the exercise.

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11. Incidents Involving Unidentified Aircraft Over Hungary.

[redacted] the following incidents of unidentified aircraft flying over Hungary:

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A. In May 1955 and unidentified aircraft flew into Hungary thru corridor #4 (see Incl #1) at an altitude of 14,000M, approx 1000KM/hr speed, flying over Budapest, Debrecen, into Rumania, and into Yugoslavia. [redacted] quite a few Hungarian officers were relieved because of this incident.

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B. Another incident, on the same date, same speed and altitude, involved an unidentified aircraft flying over Prague, Czechoslovakia, over a part of the USSR, and disappearing over Rumania.

C. In 1955, no date given, [redacted] twin-engine, piston-type aircraft flew very low over the Danube river, over Stalinvaros (4658N/1855E), hit a highvoltage line, knocking something off the aircraft. This aircraft flew into Hungary and returned to Yugoslavia. [redacted] these were three specific cases [redacted] There were many other unsolved cases of unidentified aircraft flying over Hungary.

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12. [redacted]

A. SOVIET AIRCRAFT

25X1

1. IL-28
Medium bomber
Twin-seats
Two center-spaced jet engines
Wingspan: 17M
Length: 13M
Speed: 600 KM/HR
MAX, ceiling: 12,000M
Effective radius: 4,000KM
Armament: Unk.

25X1

2. MIG-15:
Fighter
One seat
One jet engine in center.
Wingspan: 11M.
Length: 10M.
Cruising speed: 600-900 KM/HR.
Max. speed: 1050KM/HR.
Ceiling: 15,000M.
Effective radius: 1200KM.
Armament: 1-37MM cannon; 2-23MM cannons.

B. US AIRCRAFT:

1. DH VAMPIRE-1:
Fighter.
One seat
One jet engine in center.
Twin body.
Wingspan: 12M.
Length: 9M.
Speed: 700KM/HR.
Eff. radius: 1160 KMS
Ceiling: 13,700M.
Bomb load: 450 KG.
Armament: 4-20MM cannons.

2. B-47:
Light Bomber.
Crew: three persons
Six jet engines
Wingspan: 35M.
Length: 33M
Speed: 960 KM/HR.
Bomb load: 9,000KG.
Armanent: Only tail weapons.

3. B-36
Long-range bomber
Six pusher engines.
Crew: 15.
Delta Wings
Wingspan: 70M.
Length: 50M
Speed: 480 KM/HR
Eff. Radius: 16,000KM.
Ceiling: 12,000M.
Bomb load: 32,7000 KG.
Armament: 6-20MM cannons & 10-12. 7MM cannons.

4. F-86:
Fighter.
One jet engine in center.
Swept-back wings.
Wingspand: 11, 5 M.
Length: 11M.
Speed: 950 KM/HR
Eff. Radius: 2,300 KM.
Bomb load: 300 KG.
Armament: 16 Rockets: 6-12,7MM cannons.

5. F-94:
All-weather fighter.
Low-winged
Wingspan: 12 M

[redacted] 25X1

Length: 12M
Max. speed: 850 KM/HR.
Eff. Radius: 2400 KM.
Bomb load: 900 KG.
Armament: 6-12. 7MM cannons & 4-7MM machine guns.

[redacted]

- END -

Enclosures: #2: Organizational chart of the Hungarian Air Defense System 25X1

#3: Pinpoint location of OLP, Budapest

#4: Partial cross section of the underground Hq. of OLP, Budapest.

#5: Source's concept of a minute portion of the underground layout of OLP, Budapest.

#6: Layout of OLP Aircraft plotting room, Budapest

#8: Location of the Eastern Air Defense Command Post Hq at Kecskemet Airfield.

#9: Layout of Eastern Air Defense Command Post Hq. Aircraft plotting room, Kecskemet Airfield

#10: Kecskemet Air Defense Command Post Hq. - 2nd story floor plan

#11: Layout of typical GOC Post.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE HUNGARIAN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

25X1



S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Incl. 2

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

Enclosure #3

PINPOINT LOCATION OF CLP, BUDAPEST.
NON-STANDARD MAP OF BUDAPEST, KARTOGRAFIAI VALLALAT 1956; 9309 12-56. BELSOTERCLETE.





S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Enclosure #4
PARTIAL CROSS-
SECTION OF THE
UNDERGROUND HQ
OF [redacted] NEAREST.

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

Enclosure #5

[redacted] a minute portion of the underground layout of [redacted], Budapest. (Not drawn to scale) 25X1

[redacted] 25X1



S-E-C-R-E-T

Enclosure #6

Layout of OLP aircraft plotting room, Budapest.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

Enclosure #8

Location of the Eastern Air Defense Command Post Hq at Kecskemet Airfield



S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

Enclosure #(9)

LAYOUT OF EASTERN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND POST HQ
AIRCRAFT PLOTTING ROOM, KECSKEMET AIRFIELD.



S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Incl # 10

25X1

KECSKEMET AIR DEFENSE COMMAND POST HQ 2nd STORY FLOOR PLAN

25X1



S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Enclosure #11

25X1

Layout of Typical GOC Post



A. Reception room

B. Supply room

C. Radio room

D. Hallway

E. Bedroom

F. Observation pit

G. Defense position



S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

SECRET

Enclosure #1

25X1

23



- GOC POST #1—#53
- OLP
- RADAR FILTER CENTER
- GOC FILTER CENTER
- "P-8" RADAR
- "P-20" RADAR
- (S) AIR FIELDS FROM WHICH FIGHTER INTERCEPTORS ARE SCRAMBLED.

MAĎARSKÁ LIDOVÁ REPUBLIKA
ORBIS, PRAGUE 1955
1:1,000,000

SECRET

25X1



ENCLOSURE #7

EXAMPLE: POSITION OF A/C AT "X" ABOVE, WOULD BE: 1884673.

GRID FOR TRACKING A/C 29

APPROXIMATE SCALE: 1:2,000,000

SECRET

CENTER SQUARE WAS #9, HOWEVER, CONTAINED THE FOUR-DIGIT CODE #, INSTEAD OF 9.

THE SMALL NUMBERED SQUARES WERE SUB-DIVIDED INTO 9 SMALLER SQUARES UTILIZING THE SAME SYSTEM AS FOR THE LARGER BLOCKS.

EACH SMALL SQUARE COULD BE FURTHER SUBDIVIDED INTO FOUR SQUARES, AS SHOWN ABOVE. THIS WAS THE SMALLEST SUB-DIVISION.

25X1